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'9.11' SURPRISE: NEW PLOT DETAILS EMERGE WHICH SHOW THAT THE 9/11
ATTACKS WERE DESIGNED TO WEAKEN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL BY U.S POLICYMAKERS
/ KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED NOT OSAMA BIN LADEN CAME
UP WITH THE IDEA OF HIJACKING PLANES SIX YEARS PRIOR TO 9/11 / BIN
LADEN FINANCIALLY SUPPORTED HIS 9/11 PLOT
By Terry McDermott,
L. A. Times Staff Writer,
6:00 AM PDT, Friday, July 23, 2004
FLASH: 9/11 Commission Report finally lays to rest the false claim
of the Bush neocons that there was a tie between the 9/11 hijackers
and Hussein's government and the hijackings being state sponsored
by Iraq or any other country.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the man who conceived and directed the Sept.
11 terrorist attacks, was motivated by his strong disagreement with
AMERICAN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL, according to the final report of the
Sept. 11 commission.
Mohammed conceived the initial outline of the attack SIX YEARS
BEFORE ITS EXECUTION and brought the plan to al-Qaida leader Osama
bin Laden because he thought he did not have the resources to carry
it out on his own.
The Sept. 11 report, released Thursday, largely reaffirms what
has been known about the basic overview of the attacks -- much of
it first revealed by the commission's interim reports -- and contains
no revelations about the plot to attack the World Trade Center and
government buildings in and around Washington. But it ADDS FRESH
DETAILS about the people who conceived and executed it.
The report contains the fullest accounting of Mohammed's overarching
role from original conception to supervision of details. Bin Laden,
too, was fully involved, selecting all or most of the participants,
ordering the substance and the location of their training, and contributing
to the timing of the attacks and the selection of targets, the report
says.
The report makes a strong case that al-Qaida accomplished the attacks
WITHOUT any hint of STATE SPONSORSHIP. The report also appears to
LAY TO REST THE NOTION -- long alluded to by administration officials
including Vice President Dick Cheney -- that hijacker Mohamed Atta
traveled to the Czech Republic to meet an Iraqi intelligence operative
in the spring of 2001. In addition to repeating evidence that Atta
was in the United States at the time, the report revealed that the
Iraqi agent was not in Prague either when the meeting was alleged
to have occurred.
Much of the report's detail comes from interrogations of al-Qaida
operatives in U.S. custody, including Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh.
Some of that information is contradictory; much of it is difficult
to corroborate. One CIA analysis cited in the report, for example,
is titled "Khalid Shaykh Muhammed's Threat Reporting -- Precious
Truths, Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies."
The report -- in particular, its depiction of Mohammed's role --
argues against the view that al-Qaida was a huge, sophisticated
organization with boundless resources and skills. The report instead
depicts it as a relatively small core of men, headed by bin Laden,
at the center of a large web of sometimes competing and sometimes
cooperative smaller organizations and individuals throughout the
world.
This reinforces an early view of al-Qaida by a former State Department
analyst, Stephen P. Cohen, who characterized it as the Ford Foundation
of terrorism -- an organization that, at least in its formative
period, sat back and listened to proposals from individuals and
organizations for terrorist attacks.
One organization with which al-Qaida came to work closely was Jemaah
Islamiah, a terrorist group in southeast Asia. Al-Qaida provided
funding and training for the group and in return was given access
to its membership and logistical bases. Among the results of that
cooperation was an ultimately unsuccessful research program into
the development of anthrax weapons conducted by bin Laden's second
in command, Ayman Zawahiri, and an American-educated Jemaah Islamiah
chemical engineer.
Initially, Mohammed was among those freelance petitioners. Mohammed
was born in Kuwait to parents who had emigrated from Baluchistan,
a sprawling, rugged region that lies across the intersection of
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. He came to the United States for
college, earning an engineering degree from North Carolina Agricultural
and Technical State University in 1986.
After he was captured in Pakistan in early 2003, he told his interrogators
that although he had developed no special complaint about America
in his years here, he felt strongly that U.S. support of Israel
was wrong and could be corrected by attacking the United States.
Soon after graduating, Mohammed joined the Afghan fight against
the Soviet Union, working first with Afghan warlord Abdul Rasul
Sayyaf and then with Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian intellectual
who was bin Laden's mentor. Mohammed first met bin Laden during
the Afghan war but did not have a special relationship with him,
the report said.
After the war, Mohammed was inspired by the first attack on the
World Trade Center in 1993. That mission was led by Mohammed's nephew,
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, with whom Mohammed later allied in a plan to
blow up as many as a dozen American airliners over the Pacific Ocean.
The failure of that plan led Mohammed, who had been working as a
mechanical engineer in a government ministry of the Persian Gulf
sheikdom of Qatar, to take refuge in Afghanistan in 1996. It was
then that he first sought to interest bin Laden in an operation
to attack the United States from the air.
In his interrogations, Mohammed styled himself as a sort of freelance
entrepreneur of terror, seeking venture capital to fund his plans.
In an early version of the Sept. 11 plot, he proposed flying one
of the hijacked planes himself, landing it in the United States
and, after killing all the men aboard, making a speech urging America
to change its Middle Eastern policies. Bin Laden himself eliminated
that flourish from the attack plan.
Even after bin Laden approved funding for Mohammed's plot in late
1998 or early 1999, Mohammed resisted invitations to swear loyalty
to bin Laden and formally join al-Qaida. He resisted in part, he
told interrogators, because he had a prior allegiance to Sayyaf,
the Afghan warlord, who was in turn allied with the Northern Alliance,
led by Ahmed Shah Massoud.
Bin Laden was allied with the ruling Taliban, which was actively
at war with Massoud. In fact, to aid that war, al-Qaida plotted
the assassination of Massoud, which occurred just two days before
Sept. 11. Mohammed ventudally did join al-Qaida, Mohammed told interrogators.
The report offers little new on the men who led the hijackings within
the United States -- pilots Mohammed Atta, Ziad Jarrah, Marwan al-Shehhi
and Hani Hanjour -- but does provide information on the 15 other
hijackers, the men who supplied the muscle to physically take over
control of the planes.
All but one of the muscle hijackers were from Saudi Arabia and
were chosen from among volunteers at al-Qaida's Afghan camps. When
they left Saudi Arabia, almost all told their families or friends
that they were going to fight in Chechnya, but many were diverted
to Afghanistan because they were warned routes to Chechnya were
more difficult to traverse. Men who attended the al-Qaida Afghan
camps, who numbered in the thousands, were required to fill out
questionnaires on their personal histories, skills and willingness
to take part in suicide operations, according to the report.
Once planning for the plot was under way in 1999, al-Qaida operatives
checked these questionnaires for potential suicide volunteers. They
were singled out for special attention in the camps, often including
meetings with bin Laden himself. Mohammed told his interrogators
that bin Laden chose the muscle hijackers in these meetings, sometimes
making a decision on a potential hijacker in as little as 10 minutes.
Bin Laden's seeming seat-of-the-pants decision-making was in keeping
with his organization's lack of sophistication.
The report describes how Mohammed trained recruits on how to operate
in the United States by teaching them basic English phrases and
showing them how to use the Yellow Pages. He also screened Hollywood
movies that featured aircraft hijackings and bought flight simulation
software games for them to practice on.
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